

Doc. No. 1383B(18)

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TOP SECRET

Copy of the Telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, dispatched on 20 May (T.N. Year is missing) (1941?) No. 567.

In connection with the rumor that you are going to America, I heard various rumors here concerning the problems of the negotiation between Japan and America. Although from the interview with RIBBENTROP on 5th May, I learned that it was not a mere rumor. Although I intended to go on without touching this matter, in view of the tendency of this matter, and considering the future of Japan and of the influence of the Tripartite Pact, I can not remain without some deep thoughts. As I believe that it is my duty to inform you of the opinion of the German staff and also of my frank opinion, I send the separate telegrams no. 568 and no. 569.

What I want to mention to you now is as follows:

You showed me the reason why you did not inform this matter to the Italian Ambassador in Germany two times recently. However, presently I have no intentions of sounding out the problem of the confidence in me or of my position towards the people during the present critical period when the whole of our nation should act upon the "Way of the Imperial Subjects" as its primary principle. Much less do I try to sound your opinion, for the practice and technique of diplomacy belong to your department.

But what I cannot understand is that you think it is unnecessary to have me report the opinions of the Staffs of Germany and Italy, when the Japanese-American Agreement which has a very delicate relation with the Tripartite Pact, is about to be concluded. Therefore, from the standpoint of my duty as an Ambassador to Germany, I could not keep silent, and I expressed my opinion frankly in the separate telegrams, although it might be unnecessary. I beg you to take these circumstances into consideration. (End)

Copy of the Telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA to  
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.  
No. 568

1. On 3rd May Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him. When I called on him I was informed about the telegram regarding the Japanese-American negotiation. He said that although the telegram was to be kept a secret from me and the Italian Ambassador, as a friend to me, he revealed it to me for my personal understanding, since the matter is extremely serious. He then showed me the draft regarding the agreement proposed by America on 16 April. The draft consisted of four articles. He (RIBBENTROP) confessed that he was quite at a loss to understand the real intention of the Japanese government, so I answered him that Japan was observing the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, as you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) had clearly stated on your previous visit to Germany. I further told him that, accordingly, there was no reason to conclude such a treaty between Japan and America contrary to the Tripartite Pact. Thus, I avoided being concerned in this matter.

2. But on 9th of May RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him again, and he showed me OTT's telegram of the draft of the intermediary answer of Japan to America and also the telegraphic record of the conference between you and OTT which was held on 6th of May. RIBBENTROP seemed to have understood the affair clearly from the frequent telegrams sent by OTT, and according to the said intermediate reply, it is supposed that Japan has consulted regarding the understanding with America to a considerable extent, and to tell you frankly, according to the informations that Germany has gathered, from various sources, there is a report that the proposal was made by Japan. Gathering from the conversation of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and OTT, it seems to me that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was compelled by a certain group to consent to it. Moreover, it is reported that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA during the course of that conference stated that Japan will participate in a Russo-German war, if it should breakout. When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany recently, he said, as his personal opinion, that Japan was going to attack SINGAPORE, but it seems that you have changed your opinion.

I have some doubts as to the true intention of ROOSEVELT.

If you should become obliged to conclude this agreement in order to avoid the participation in a remotely possible war, the Tripartite Pact would in reality become meaningless even if it may be possible to hit upon some legal pretext. Moreover, I believe that in Japan's progress, she will lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia. After lengthy thoughts concerning this problem, I thought of the following two plans from the German viewpoint.

- (a) Plan to refuse the proposal of America.
- (b) Plan to conclude the Japanese-American agreement under the condition that America maintain a neutral attitude without extending 'convoy' patrol lines.

RIBBENTROP asked my (Ambassador OSHIMA) opinion, saying that he wished to report plan (a) to the Fuhrer as he believed it to be a good one. Therefore, although I did not receive any instruction, I conjectured the intention of the Japanese government from common sense, and as my personal opinion, insisted upon plan (b) explaining that (b) would be much more advantageous to Germany. The reasons that I explained to RIBBENTROP were as follows:

If plan (b) are adopted, Germany will be able to fight a single combat against Britain and terminate the war in a short time. Again, although it might be wishful thinking, perhaps the "ROOSEVELT faction" may recognize the fact that America's assistance to Britain would be useless, and would make it a reason to alleviate America's assistance to Britain.

Even in case of its failure, it is useful at least for ascertaining ROOSEVELT's actual intentions concerning the assistance to Britain. Thirdly, it will enable those Japanese who want the cooperation with America to realize its impossibility. However, RIBBENTROP said that America would utilize this negotiation to estrange Japan from Germany, as long as this negotiation continued, and he repeated the same thing in telegram no. 545 (dispatched to TURKEY, no. 11). He further stated that it is possible for America to utilize it as propaganda material to convince the anti-war faction in America that America could now advance to the Atlantic Ocean because of the elimination of apprehension in Pacific area, and consequently the situation would become very dangerous to Germany. Therefore, he did not agree with my opinion, and said that at any rate this problem has not yet been decided by the Fuhrer, so he wanted



to send a telegram on the evening of the same day to the Fuhrer, who was out of BERLIN, for a decision. At the same time, he wished to report my opinion to the Fuhrer. Then I asked him whether or not he had consulted with Italy already. To my question, he answered that Italy has already received all the reports from Ambassador INDERLI, but he had not yet consulted directly with the Italian government, but that as soon as he received the decision of the Fuhrer, he wished to send the telegram to OTT so that he might consult Italy.

2. As I made a promise to Prime Minister MUSSOLINI to visit him at the beginning of this month, I started for ROME on the night of the 10th. On the morning of the 12th, Minister BISMARCK visited me, and by orders of RIBBENTROP, he showed me the telegraphic instructions to OTT and added that the Italian government had the same opinion as Germany. After I read that instruction, I recognized that the Fuhrer had made a different decision from that of RIBBENTROP. In the afternoon of 13th, RIBBENTROP flew unexpectedly to ROME and met MUSSOLINI and CIANO on the same day, and asked me to visit him on the morning of the 14th. When I went to see him, he showed me the telegram from OTT concerning the interview on the 12th, between you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) and the two Ambassadors of Germany and Italy in Tokyo. He expressed deep discontentment at your statement that you had been in a position where you were compelled to commence with the negotiation with America and that because of internal reasons, you were unable to await the arrival of opinions from Germany and Italy. He asked reproachfully why couldn't you await the telegraphic instructions when they were sure to arrive in several days. I told him that although I was not aware of the circumstances, I guessed that Japan was compelled to take such a measure because of the following reasons: It was necessary for Japan to conclude the agreement as soon as possible to maintain secrecy, and in Japan such important negotiations as this must be privately reported to the Emperor. I added that I believed that the agreement was not made out of inconsideration to Germany and Italy. RIBBENTROP, however, would not readily accept my words. He said that when you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) visited Germany, he met you (MATSUOKA) many times but he did not hear anything substantial concerning the Japanese-American agreement which is closely related to the Tripartite Pact. He said that it came as a great surprise to him when he received such a report soon after you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) returned to Japan. He continued that frankly he was much afraid that the agreement might make the Tripartite Pact automatically meaningless. He also said that as he

(RIBBENTROP) had remarked the other day, he did not believe ROOSEVELT from the very beginning, and that although his opinion was to advise Japan to refuse the American proposal he had to send a telegraphic instruction contrary to his own opinion. Hearing that I told him that it was a great pity to have a misunderstanding between Japan and Germany concerning this matter, so I gave advice to him that it was very necessary to inform OTT of his opinion, to make the facts clear and certain. When I visited Foreign Minister CIANO on the evening of the same day, it seemed that an interview had already taken place between RIBBENTROP, MUSSOLINI and CIANO, since CIANO expressed the same opinion as RIBBENTROP.

3. No sooner did I return to BERLIN on May 17th, than I was asked by Vice Minister WEISEGGER to visit him. When I called on him, he, by the telegraphic order of RIBBENTROP at FUSSELL, showed me a draft of Japan's answer to America which was telegraphed by OTT on the 14th, and the draft of the instruction of the German government to OTT concerning Japan's answer to America. He (WEISEGGER) said that as he received the order only to show me (Ambassador OSHIMA) the telegram, he will not express any opinion, but that in view of the present political situation, the German government had a deep concern about the result of this problem. He added that the German government attached great importance to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's statement to OTT to the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-German war. He (WEISEGGER) then asked me whether or not Foreign Minister MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs between Germany and Russia when he returned from his stay in Germany. I told him that I did not know what the Foreign Minister had revealed concerning Japan's attitude toward a Russo-German war, but that in Japan, such an important matter as this should be decided by the Emperor, and that probably Foreign Minister MATSUOKA must have expressed his personal opinion. I further added that since the Foreign Minister had many interviews with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP during his stay in Germany I had no doubt that you (MATSUOKA) were aware of the real relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia.

(End)

Telegram No. 569 sent by Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

1. As I reported in the separate telegram, the German government has a deep dissatisfaction concerning the problem of the Japanese-American agreement, and has much apprehension about the future of the Tripartite Pact. Since America is actually participating in the war, if Japan, ignoring the present circumstances, should conclude an agreement with America, it would be very natural for Germany to suspect that Japan is trying to check America's participation in the war, and at the same time trying to avoid her own obligation of participating in the war. When you came to Germany, all the people in Germany heartily welcomed you, and delighted in the strengthening of the 'Axis'. Since this is directly after that occasion, the feeling that Germany was betrayed is very strong.

2. I am well aware of Japan's desire to solve the China Incident as soon as possible in order to have time to spare for politics, economy and other fields. However, the European war is developing very favourably for Germany and Italy. In a few months, very important developments are expected, and if at this time Japan should lose the confidence and trust of Germany and Italy who will become the leaders in Europe, simply for an immediate profit, it is very unfavourable. Needless to say, America seems to have proposed the agreement as a temporary measure for estranging Japan from the Tripartite Alliance. I am afraid that such a two-faced diplomacy should lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war.

3. Aside from the point that if Japan solves the China Incident with the support of America, she will leave an uneradicated root of future calamity, I express my apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking SINGAPORE at random, she will invite the contempt of not only America and Britain, but also those of Germany and Italy. And, should America, taking advantage of the elimination of fear in the Pacific area, reinforce her assistance to Britain, the development of the European War would greatly be affected although America may avoid nominal participation in the war. Subsequently, Japan may suffer from some unexpected calamity. Moreover, should Japan abandon her right to leadership in the Southern regions for the sake of America, it is clear that Japan cannot stress the leadership to Germany and Italy.



This will mean that Japan abandoned her great mission to establish a new order in the Greater East Asia.

4. Last autumn, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, and the road our people should follow was made clear. But, if Japan should conclude the Japanese-American Agreement now, our people in Japan would be bewildered as to which path they should follow. Moreover, our friendly countries will despise Japan and will not trust Japan any longer. Subsequently, Japan will fall into international isolation, and will gain nothing. Therefore, I hope earnestly that the Japanese Government will embody the following two points, if the conclusion of the agreement is unavoidable:

- (a) As conditions to the conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement, it is absolutely necessary for Japan that she should make use of her situation over America, and establish the idea of the Tripartite Pact, by upholding the principle that Japan is to facilitate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain. Again, Japan should demand America's neutrality in the European war, and at the same time, make clear that Japan has an obligation to participate in the war, based upon the Tripartite Pact. If America does not accept our proposal, Japan must not conclude the agreement.
- (b) It is most unfavourable for Japan to give the impression to Germany and Italy that the Japanese government is compelled to conclude the agreement on account of the increasing influence of a party in Japan that wants status quo. The conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement will only make Germany and Italy increasingly suspect that Japan took this action in order to avoid the obligation to participate in the war. Therefore, concerning the Japanese-American negotiation, Japan has to exchange frank opinions with Germany and Italy, and must thoroughly convince Germany and Italy about the purport of article (a).

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極秘

外機密

No 1

五月二十日大島大使発松岡大臣宛電報寫

第五六七号

日米交渉問題ニ付テハ貴大臣ノ渡米説ト關聯シ當地ニ  
於テ種々ノ風説ヲ耳ニシ居リシカ五月五日リ山外相ト會談  
ニ依リ右カ早ナル風説ニアサルコトヲ承知シタモ貴大臣ノ意  
圖ヲ付度シ本使トシテ本件ニ干與セサル建前ニ進ミト  
存セシカ本件ノ推移ヲ見テ本使ハ帝國ノ前途甚ニ三國  
條約ハ影郷害ヲ考ヘ深慮ニ堪ヘサルモノアリ独逸自腦部  
ノ意向並卑見ヲ率直ニ貴大臣ニ披瀝スル本使ノ當然  
ノ義務ナルヲ信シ別電第五六八号及第五六九号ノ通  
事申ヌ

尙此ノ際保セテ申上度ハ最近兩國ニ亘リ本件ヲ在独伊大使  
通報セラル理由ヲ示シタモカ本使現下ノ重大時局ニ於テ  
万民正道實踐ヲ第一トスルモ信任ノ問題トカ國民ノ立場  
トカヲ詮索セントスルカ如キ意ハ毫末モナシ況ンヤ外交實  
施及技術ハ貴大臣ノ主宰セラレ居ル所ナルニ於テオヤ  
唯本使ノ理解ニ得サルハ三國條約ト極大ニ機微ノ關係ニ在ル  
日米協定ヲ結ハントセラルニ當リ本使等ヲシテ独伊自腦部  
ノ意向向ヲ報告セシムル要ナシトセララルニ在リ從テ別電亦  
蛇足感アルモ本使駐独大使ノ任ニ在ル限り職責上默スル  
能ハス虚心坦懷ニ所信ヲ述ヘタルモノナルヲ諒セラレタム

五月二十日大島大使発松岡大臣宛電報寫

第五六八号

五月三日リ山外相ハ本使ノ來訪ヲ求メ本日「ソート」ヨリ日米



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交渉ニ関スル電報ヲ接受セルカ本件ハ貴大使及在伊大使  
知ラササルコトニナリトノ趣ニ付貴大使ニ申上ケ得ル由ヲ  
ルモ何分事極大ニ重大ナルヲ以テ友人トシテ貴大使ニ秘匿  
スル能ハス貴大使個人ノ令ミ迄ニ申上ケル次ナルヲ以テ  
右申承知アリタリトシテ四月十六日米國提案協定案  
骨子四ヶ條ノ電報ヲ示シ自今(リ)ハ突然日本ヨリ斯ル提  
案ヲ受ケ會員ハ日本政府ノ真意ヲ知ルニ苦シミアル日ヲ述  
ヘタルニ付本使ハ先般松岡外相訪独ノ際判然述ヘラレ如  
ク日本ハ三國條約ヲ外交ノ基調ト爲シアルヲ以テ日米間ニ  
之ニ背馳スルカ如キ約束ヲ結フ詎トシテ答ヘ本件ニ關係ヲ  
避ケ置キタリ

ニ此ルニ五月九日更ニ(リ)ハ本使ノ來訪ヲ求メ(リ)トヨリ電報  
アリタル米國ニ對スル日本ノ中間回答案並ニ五月六日ニ於ケル  
貴大使ト(リ)トノ會談記錄電報ヲ示シ(リ)ハ傳次(リ)ト  
電ニヨリ明カトナリタルカ右中間回答ニ依リハ日本ハ既ニ本  
題ニ関シ相當米國ト深入リタル協議ヲ爲シアルモト察セ  
レ又打明ケ申上ケハ独逸ノ今日迄諸方面ヨリ接取  
セル情報中ニハ本件ハ日本ヨリ提案セエタリト爲セルノ  
アリ又松岡外相ノ(リ)トニ對スルオ語ヨリ察スルニ松岡外相  
カ或一派ニ引摺ツレ己ヲ得ス之ニ同意セルカ如ク見ラル猶又  
該會談中松岡外相ハ獨ソシ戦争起ラハ日本カ之ニ参加  
スルニ至ルハキコトヲ述ヘラレタルカ松岡外相先般來独ノ際  
私見トシテ承リタル新嘉坡攻撃ヲ行ハントスル御意見ハ

No. 2

Doc/383B(18)

全ク即改メナリタルモノト考ヘラル

予ハハルスベルトノ真意ヲ疑フモノニシテ然レ此等ニ乗セシ又  
萬一ノ場合ニ於ケル参戦ノ義務ヲ回避スルヲ本協定ヲ締結  
セラルコト、モナレハ法理上ハ何トモ理窟ヲ着目セ得ルモ事實上  
三國條約ハ骨板キトナルヘク又日本ノ前途ニ執リテモ亦要ニ  
於ケル指導權確立ノ機ヲ失セラルモノト考フ予ハ本問題  
取扱ニ関シ熟慮、結果独逸側意見トシテ決シ案ヲ考  
フ

(イ) 米國ノ提案ヲ拒否セラル、案

(ロ) 米國カフコボイル噴戒線擴張等ヲ行ハス真ニ中意、然  
度ヲ保持スルコトヲ條件トシテ日米協定ヲ結ブ案

自分(リ)ハ(イ)案ヲ何ト信シ之ヲ總統ニ具申シラシト存シカ  
貴見如何ト問ヒタルヲ以テ本使ハ何等訓令ニ按シ居テ是モ  
常識的ニ帝國政府ノ意圖ヲ忖度シ本使ハ私見トシテ  
ニ対シ(ロ)案ヲ有利トスルヲ主張シ之カ理由トシテ若シ該案  
成立セハ独逸ハ英國ト一騎打ヲ爲シ得 對英戦争ヲ締結  
ヲ速カチルルヲ得ヘク又之ハ虫ノ良キ考方カモ知シカモ  
或ハハルスベルト一派カ對英援助ノ無效ナルヲ知リ之ヲ緩  
和セントスル理由ニ利用スル場合モ全然ナシト考ヘシ又  
不成立ノ場合ニ於テモ少クモハルスベルトノ對英援助ニ関スル  
真意ヲ確メ得ル利益アルヘク又我國内ニ於テ日米協調ヲ  
考フル者ニモ其ノ不可能ナルコトヲ納得セシメ得ヘト述ベタリ  
然ルニ(リ)ハ自分ハ本文交渉ヲ繼續スル間米國ハ之ヲ日独離  
間ニ利用スヘトテ往電才五四五号(土耳其宛才一二号)件  
ヲ述ヘ又米國內ニ於テモ非戰派ニ對スル説得材料ニ利用  
シ之ヲ以テ太平洋ハ既ニ心配ナキカ故ニ大西洋ニ進出シテ可

No. 3

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No. 4

ナリト云々誠ニ危険ナリト述(本使、意見三番成也、先、自、本件、未、之、と、總統、裁、決、經、居、ヲ、以、テ、今、後、皇、白、練、外、三、在、北、總、統、下、電、報、其、裁、決、受、命、下、之、其、際、貴、大、使、ノ、意、見、モ、併、セ、述、フ、ヘ、ト、以、答、ヘ、タリ、依、テ、本、使、ハ、伊、太、利、側、ト、ハ、既、ニ、協、議、セ、シ、タリ、ヤ、ト、同、ヘ、ル、ニ、伊、太、利、側、モ、イ、ン、テ、リ、大、使、ヨリ、一、切、ヲ、報、告、セ、ラ、シ、テ、モ、未、タ、直、接、伊、太、利、ト、協、議、シ、ア、フ、ス、ト、ハ、裁、決、ア、リ、次、オ、フ、ス、ト、ニ、對、ス、ル、訓、電、ヲ、起、草、ス、ル、ヲ、以、テ、之、ニ、依、リ、伊、太、利、ト、協、議、ス、ル、答、ナリト、答、ヘ、タリ、

ニ、本、使、ハ、既、ニ、本、月、初、メ、ハ、首、相、訪、向、ノ、約、ナリ、居、リ、十、日、夜、發、フ、ロ、マ、ニ、赴、キ、ニ、十、二、日、朝、ヒ、ス、マ、ク、ハ、公、使、本、使、ヲ、來、訪、シ、リ、命、ナリト、テ、フ、オ、ツ、ト、ニ、對、ス、ル、訓、電、ヲ、示、ス、ト、其、ニ、伊、太、利、政、府、モ、之、ト、同、意、見、ナ、ル、ト、日、述、ケ、ル、カ、該、案、ヲ、讀、ム、ニ、及、ビ、テ、總、統、カ、リ、リ、ノ、意、見、ニ、及、ビ、タル、裁、決、ヲ、知、リ、然、ル、ニ、十、三、日、午、后、リ、ハ、突、然、フ、ロ、マ、ニ、飛、來、シ、同、日、ハ、モ、ク、ト、會、見、シ、十、四、日、午、前、本、使、ノ、來、訪、ヲ、求、メ、タリ、依、テ、彼、ヲ、往、訪、セ、ル、ニ、十、二、日、東、京、ニ、於、ケ、ル、貴、大、臣、ト、獨、伊、大、使、ト、會、見、シ、同、ス、ル、フ、オ、ツ、ト、ノ、電、報、ヲ、示、シ、貴、大、臣、カ、内、政、ノ、關、係、上、獨、伊、意、見、到、美、國、ヲ、待、ツ、能、ハ、ス、米、國、ニ、對、シ、之、交、渉、ヲ、開、始、セ、サ、ル、ヘ、リ、サ、ル、事、情、ニ、在、ル、ヲ、述、ヘ、シ、タリト、テ、大、臣、不、滿、ヲ、表、シ、僅、カ、數、日、間、待、テ、ハ、獨、伊、訓、電、到、着、ス、ヘ、キ、答、ナ、ル、ニ、何、故、之、ヲ、待、テ、得、サ、リ、ヤ、ト、云、ヘ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、本、使、ハ、全、然、其、ノ、事、密、實、ヲ、知、ラ、サ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、何、ト、モ、申、上、ケ、ラ、シ、タ、ル、モ、秘、密、保、持、ノ、關、係、上、速、ニ、之、ヲ、解、決、ス、ル、必、要、アリ、又、日、本、ニ、於、テ、ハ、此、ノ、種、重、要、交、渉、ハ、陛、下、ニ、内、奏、申、上、ケ、ル、關、係、モ、アリ、或、ハ、此、等、ノ、理、由、ニ、ヨ、リ、己、方、ヲ、得、サ、ル、ニ、出、テ、タ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、ト、相、像、ス、ル、モ、獨、伊、ニ、對、ス、ル、不、親、切、ニ、非、サ、ル、コ、ト、ハ、確、信、ス、ト、述、ヘ、タリ、



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然ルニ「リ」ハ容易ニ納得セ又定ハ松岡外相訪独、際度々  
面接セルニ三國條約ニ密接ナル関係アル日本協定ニ関シ  
何等具體的、御諾モタク松岡外相停朝早々斯、如キ  
通知ニ接セルコト實ニ意外ニ感シ居ル所ニシテ率直ニ申言  
ハ自分「リ」ハ三國條約ニ因テ弛緩ヲ致スモト痛ク憂  
慮シ居リ、先日モ申上ケタル如ク自分「リ」ハ始メ  
「リス」アルト「ラ」信セス日本ニ米國ノ提案拒絶ヲ即勸メ  
セントスル意見ナリシモ自分、考ト違ヒタル案ヲ訓電アル  
コトナリタリト述ヘタルヲ以テ本件ニ関シ日独兩國政府  
間ニ於テ誤解起ルコトハ最モモムヘキコトナルヲ以テ尚懸念ハ  
「オット」ニ訓令セウシ十二令ニ申確メタルコト極メテ緊要ナル  
ヲ録込ヘシ注意シ置ケリ 同は夕「ム」外相ヲ訪問セルニ既ニ  
「リ」カ「ム」及「ケ」ト語合ヒタルニ「テ」リ「ト」同様ノ意見ヲ  
述セリ

三 五月十七日本使停伯スルヤ直ニ「ワイセツカ」次官ハ來ニ  
ヨリ往訪セルニ「ワ」ハ在「フツ」ル「リ」ノ電命ニ依ルトテ  
十四日附「オット」來電日本ノ對米國答復並ニ之ニ基クテ  
ニ對スル獨逸政府ノ訓令案ヲ提示シ自分「リ」ハ貴大使  
ニ電文ヲ提示スヘキ訓令ヲ受ケアル「ミ」タルヲ以テ何等意見ヲ  
述ヘントスルニ非サルモ特ニ現在ノ政局上獨逸政府ハ本件問題  
成行ニ深キ關心ヲ有シアルコトヲ述ヘ又松岡外相カ若シ獨蘇  
開戦セハ日本ハ「ソ」聯邦ヲ攻撃スヘキコトヲ「オット」ニ述ヘ  
「エ」タルコトハ独「乙」之ヲ重要視シ「アリ」、外相ハ滞独中独

No. 5

Doc 1383 B (18)

蘇關係、真相ヲ了解シテ歸ヘシタルヤト問ヘルヲ以テ本使  
ハ獨蘇開戦ニ際シ日本ノ執ルべき態度ニ関シ外相カ何  
ト云ハシタカハ知ラセトモ斯ル重大ナル事柄ハ我國ニ於テハ  
聖断ニ俟ツべきモノナシハ現ニテ外相ハ私見ヲ述ベシタルモノ  
ナルヘク又外相ハ滯獨中度々外相トモ會見セシタルニ  
付獨蘇關係ノ真相ヲ知ラシアルコトヲ疑ハスト答(置答)

### 大島大使發松岡大臣宛第五九号電報

一 日米協定問題ニ関シ獨逸側ニ於テ深刻ナル不滿ヲ  
有シ三國條約ノ前途ニ関シ多大ノ危惧ヲ有シ居ルコト別  
電、如シ甚重シ米國カ既ニ事實上參戰シ居ル今日  
其ノ現状ヲ默過シ日米間ニ於テ協定ヲ結フハ恰モ  
日本ハ米國ノ參戰ヲ阻止シ得セテ自國ノ參戰義務  
ヲ回避スルモノナリトノ疑惑ヲ抱クハ獨逸トシテ己ヲ得ル  
所ナルヘク殊ニ先般貴大臣ノ伊來獨ニ際シ獨乙朝野カ  
與テ之ヲ歡迎、意ヲ表シ杞軸、強化ヲ記歌シタル直後  
ナル又獨乙トシテ衷切ニシタリトノ感ヲ強クシ居ル次第ナリ  
二 帝國カ支那事變、速急解決ヲ圖リ政治經濟若般  
ノ餘猶ヲ得トスル必要ハ本使トシテモ了解スル所ナリト  
雖モ今ヤ歐洲戰爭ハ益々獨伊ニ有利ニ進展シ此處數  
ケ日ノ中ニ重大ナル發展ノ豫測セシ居ル際目前、利益  
爲ニ歐洲ニ於テ指導的地位ヲ確保スヘキ獨伊不信  
ヲ招クコト果シテ妥當ナルヤ多大ノ疑問ナリ況ンヤ米國  
ノ提案ハ早ニ日本ヲ三國同盟ヨリ切離サトスル一時的、

16.6

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策謀ニ過キル與解カラサルニ於テ方ヤ本使ハ斯ク、  
如キ面外交ハ戰後來ルヘキ重大危局ニ於テ帝國ヲ  
完全ナル國際的孤立ニ陷ラシムルモノナラズトヲ惧ル  
三、更ニ米國、口添ニ依リ支那事變、解決ヲ計ルヲ力  
將來ニ關シ重大ナル禍根ヲ残スモノク、真、暫ク措置  
此、絶好、機會ニ南方經略ヲ抛棄シ況ヤ何時ニモ  
新嘉坡ヲ攻略シ得ヘト、見込スヲ失フカ如キハ單ニ  
英米ノミナラス獨伊、輕侮スヲ招クモノナラサルヤ而テ  
今後米國ニシテ太平洋ニ於ケル後顧憂ヲキコトヲ  
良キコトニシ名義上、參戰ニ避ケツ、對英援助ヲ強化シカ  
如キ場合ニ於テハ歐洲戰局、發展ニモ影響普スル所甚  
カラサルヘク帝國ニトシ不測、害生スルコトヲキヲ保セス  
尚米國ニ對シ大東亞ニ包含セラルヘキ南方地域ニ對スル我  
指導權ヲ抛棄スルニ於テハ獨伊ニ對シテ之ヲ主張スト  
能ハサルハ明カニシテ大東亞新秩序建設ニ關スル我大使命  
ヲ抛棄シタルモノト云ハサルヘカラス

四、昨秋三國條約締結ニ依リ國民、向フ所明カトナリシニ  
今又日米協定ヲ締結スルニ於テハ内國民ヲシテ其ノ帰趨ニ迷  
ハシメ外交邦ノ不信ト輕侮トヲ招キ實利ヨリスルモ國  
際的孤立ヲ招来スルニ過キサルコトヲ惧ル次第ナリ帝  
國政府ニ於テ協定締結ヲ已ムヲ得ストセラルニ付テハ之  
トモテ、二件實現ヲ切望ス

No. 7

(イ) 日米協定ヲ締結スルハ日本カ米國ニ對スル地位ヲ利  
三國條約ノ精神ヲ補充シ獨伊、對英作戰ヲ容易ク  
シムモノナリト、主義ヲ確立シ米國ニ對シ歐洲戰爭ニ  
關シ眞、中立ヲ要求スルト共ニ三國條約ニ基キ我カ參戰



No. 8

Doc 1383B(18)

義務ヲ明カセラルルニ絶対ニ必要ナリト存ス。而シテ米國  
ニシテ之ヲ容シサレハ協定ハ締結スヘカラス  
(四) 独伊ヲシテ事件ヲ以テ日本ニ於ケル現状維持派カ勢力  
ヲ得来ル爲己ムヲ得ヌ故協定ヲ締結スルモノナリト、  
印島ヲ抱カシムルニ最モ我ニ不利ニシテ右ハ独伊ヲシテ  
日本ハ参戰回避ノ念ヨリ此舉ヲ出テタリトノ疑惑ヲ  
深カラシムルニナリ依リ日本交渉ニ付テハ独伊トノ同意  
ナキ意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ、趣旨ヲ独伊ニ徹底セラルル必要  
アルヘシ(了)

Minister )  
Vice-Minister ) submitted separately )  
Chief of AMERICA Bureau ) (T.N. these notations  
Chief of EUROPE-ASIA Bureau ) were marked in the margin)

(50 13743)

SECRET -- Embassy CHO Code

(T.N. In the copy, there  
are 2 stamps indicating  
TOP SECRET.)

Dispatched A.M. May 21, 1941  
from BERLIN.  
Arrived P.M. May 21, 1941  
this office.

To the Foreign Minister

from Ambassador OSHIMA

No. 575

The JAPANESE-AMERICAN Agreement now under negotiation,  
is thought to be important change in the national policy,  
and it concerns greatly with the plans of the JAPANESE military  
and naval attaches in Germany. Therefore, recognizing the  
fact that it is necessary to transmit this agreement to them  
beforehand, telegrams No. 567, No. 568, and No. 569 were sent  
exclusively to both attaches today, the 20th. As regards this  
matter, I wish you will inform the War Minister, the Naval  
Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and the Chief of the  
Navy General Staff.

No. 4x1076

陸軍省  
陸軍大臣  
陸軍省  
陸軍省

1383B(20)

電信局長 (20)

(総) 13743

外機室 倉長行 號

外務大臣

大島大使

昭和十一年五月二十日 前達伯林發 (機)

九月二十日 前達本省着

第五五號

御交渉中、日米協定、重天に國策、變更ト考ヘ己我陸海軍  
武官、狹遠ニ於ケル諸企劃ニ關係スル所大ナル以テ之ヲ豫メ傳  
會シク必要アリト認メ本十日兩武官限リ、合シトシテ陸海軍第五  
號、第五八號、第五九號ヲ兩武官ニ提示セシ付、貴大臣ヨリ主  
陸海軍大臣、參謀總長、軍令部總長、御示願アリ(了)



Doc. / 383B(20)

No. 2

五月三十一日 大島大使發 外務大臣宛電報

第五十五號

御交渉中、日本協定ハ重大ナル國策、變更ト考  
ヘラシ我陸海軍武官、独逸ニ於ケル諸企劃ニ関  
係スル所、大ナル以テ之ヲ豫メ傳ヘ置ク必要アリト認  
メ本三十日兩武官限リ、合ミトシテ往電第五十六號  
第五十八號、第五十九號ヲ兩武官ニ提示セルニ付、  
貴大臣ヨリモ陸海軍大臣參謀總長、軍令部  
總長ヘ御示シ願ヒタシ

(了)